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Abstract The paper analyzes the ambiguous interplay of some human cognitive
dispositions and competitive forces: (a) people have a want for a certain amount
of novelty—potentially induced by competition-driven innovation—but emotionally
resist an excessive degree of novel mental experiences; and (b) competition-driven
change introduces challenges to agents that may result in fluid life states when skills
and cognitive resources enable an individual to meet these challenges or in strained
life states if this is not the case. As a result, some affective constraints to economic
development and potential implications for economic theory development and policy
making are identified.
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1 Introduction
This paper shows that there are potential limits to economic dynamics that are to be
found within human beings and that have not been, hitherto, the subject matter of
economic theory. The proposed approach adds some cognitive and affective aspects
to a behavioral model of economic agents.
Affective primordial components of the human brain, evolved during human phy-
logeny, provide the grounding for the capacities of humans’ more recently evolved cog-
nitive apparatus (Panksepp 2003a). Consequently, there are strong linkages between
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consciousness and affect (see, example, Kaufman 1999). These affective dispositions
contribute to an explanation of biases in humans’ attention in receiving information,
choosing stored information for further cognitive processing, decision making, and
the determinants of subjective well-being.
The paper’s approach is based on the continuity hypothesis (Witt 2003b, 15f, 2004).
This hypothesis represents a way of showing how Darwinian theory is relevant for
economics: the human species is a result of natural (Darwinian) evolution; natural
evolution has shaped the ground and still defines the constraints for human-made, or
cultural, evolution. The historical process of economic evolution can be conceived as
emerging from, and being embedded in, the constraints shaped by evolution in nature.
Darwinian theory explains the origins of economic evolution in human phylogeny and
fosters the understanding of the lasting influence of innate elements, dispositions, and
programs on behavior, which result from the forces of natural selection and which
impose limitations on cultural evolution.
Competition is a determinant of economic change and variance of human behav-
ior. It is regarded as a progressive element in the dynamics of capitalism causing the
ceaseless economic movement and transformation across time and space (see Metcalfe
2001). Innovation is the driving force behind much of competition and, conversely,
competition drives innovation. Economic evolution proceeds through the generation
of variety in competition (Nelson 1990). By referring to insights from cognitive neu-
roscience, physiology, and psychology, it will be shown how human agents affectively
evaluate novelty and perceived challenges that emerge in a dynamic competitive envi-
ronment. As a result, some affective constraints upon economic development are iden-
tified. Moreover, it will be expounded how these findings relate to theory development
in economics, especially in the realms of welfare and normative economics.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 shows how humans affectively evaluate
different amounts of novel mental experiences. Section 3 examines the connections
between an agent’s skills and cognitive resources on the one hand, and challenges
posed by the environment on the other. Again, the resulting affectively evaluated life
states are taken into account. Section 4 presents some implications of the insights
gained for economic theory and policy making. It is shown that limits to economic
dynamics exist within human beings. Finally, Section 5 offers some conclusions.
2 The first ambiguity: the human want for novelty
Humans enjoy a certain amount of novel mental experiences. Excitement through
novelty is an important form of human satisfaction (Piaget 1952; Scitovsky 1981;
Loewenstein 1994; Zuckerman 1994; Bardo et al. 1996; Bianchi 2002). However, as
will be shown below, the desire for experiencing a certain amount of novelty is subject
to deprivation and satiation.
Established findings from psychology show that young infants prefer novel stimuli
(see, example, McCall et al. 1977; Ranganath and Rainer 2003). However, the want
for novelty is a behavioral tendency manifested not only by human infants, but also by
human adults and animals (see, example, Najm-Briscoe et al. 2000). An agent’s capa-
bility to distinguish between what is novel and what has already been experienced, or
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between degrees of novelty, and to (affectively) evaluate those events for subsequent
behavioral action encompasses fundamental cognitive processes, enabling humans to
appropriately react to stimuli in their environment.
Findings from cognitive neuroscience have demonstrated the existence of special-
ized neural mechanisms for detecting, attending to, and remembering of novel events.
The underlying physiology and neuroanatomical substrates of the brain’s response
to novel events have been the subject matter of many inquiries (for a review of this
literature see Friedman et al. 2001; Ranganath and Rainer 2003). Prefrontal, cortical,
and parietal neurons, for example, respond more strongly to novel than to familiar
stimuli, i.e., they exhibit a preference for novelty. A complex network of brain regions
and processes responds to stimuli that are novel.
Another powerful behavioral tendency is an organism’s inclination to prefer pleas-
ant over aversive stimuli. The human brain is capable of elaborating an affective form of
consciousness that belongs to its motivational systems and is built upon neural systems
that monitor bodily states (Buck 1985; Panksepp 2003a). In this way, positive affective
experiences enable humans to engage aspects of the world in ways that are valuable
in sustaining life and well-being, while negative affective experiences inform humans
of aspects that should be avoided because they compromise life and well-being (see
also Kahneman et al. 1997). Alongside the perception of the state of the body, there
is the perception of thoughts and certain modes of thinking in higher brain regions
with contents consonant with the emotion, i.e., the affective evaluation of these states
(Damasio 2003, p. 85). The combination of these perceptions constitutes a feeling
state.
Different degrees of novelty have different behavioral effects and are evaluated
affectively in different ways (Maddi 1961b; Scitovsky 1981; Wasserman et al. 2004).1
Moderately novel situations or episodes characterized by a moderate proportion of
elements that differ from those of preceding situations or episodes, do produce pleas-
ant stimuli and approach behavior.2 Some variation in stimulation is sought out by the
organism and is required for normal development and functioning (Fiske and Maddi
1961; Zuckerman 1994; Bardo et al. 1996). On the other hand, extremely novel situa-
tions or episodes characterized by a large proportion of elements that differ from the
ones of preceding situations or episodes or that include elements which are unique in
the life history of an organism are experienced as unpleasant and trigger avoidance
behavior (Maddi 1961a; Wasserman et al. 2004).
In this context, the degree or amount of novelty that an agent encounters is a com-
pound variable consisting of the novelty’s content and the frequency of novel stimu-
lation, which both determine stimulus intensity. A rare single event in an organism’s
environment may have a high novelty content that triggers intensive affective reaction.
On the other hand, there may be frequent stimuli carrying a moderate novelty content
1 According to norm theory (Kahneman and Miller 1986), novel events elicit especially strong Good/Bad
values by emotional amplification.
2 Novel stimuli comprise either stimuli that are different from recently experienced stimuli, or stimuli which
are to some extent unprecedented in the organism’s history (see Maddi 1961a). The first type of novelty is
relative, while the second is more absolute. In the context of this paper, novelty is most adequately defined
with regard to the subjective representation of past experience.
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that amount to a similar affective evaluation. The overall affective evaluation of an
episode is determined by the relative frequencies, duration, and intensity of affec-
tive experiences (see Kahneman 1999). Hence, within the scope of the approaches
drawn upon in this paper, the multidimensional variable ‘novelty’ is collapsed into a
unidimensional quantity.
An inverted U-shaped relation between the degree of novelty (as the independent
variable) and some measure of an agent’s well-being (as the dependent variable) can
be assumed. There are—in a psycho-physiological context—areas of excitation and
positive excitability and inhibition and negative excitability by novel stimuli (see
McCall et al. 1977; Anderson 1990).3 Moreover, novelty contributes in determining
an organism’s level of neurophysiological activation or arousal (Steriade 1996) and
thus influences the affective evaluation of situations.4 Fiske and Maddi (1961) have
argued that, to a considerable extent, affect is a function of the discrepancy between
actual and characteristic levels of activation or arousal, i.e., large discrepancies are
ordinarily associated with negative affect (unpleasant), while positive affect (pleas-
ant) is experienced when such discrepancies are reduced (see also Ursin and Eriksen
2004).5
In a similar manner, Berlyne (1960, p. 194, 1971) argued, in his path-breaking
research on curiosity, that there is an optimal influx of arousal potential for an indi-
vidual organism. He claimed that the human desire for novelty serves as a regulating
mechanism of states of arousal or activation and, closely connected to this, the capac-
ity to sustain attention to the external world. Arousal potential that deviates in either
an upward or a downward direction will be aversive.
According to neuropsychological findings, organisms are motivated to alter envi-
ronmental inputs, i.e., to reduce stimulus variability when too much is present and to
increase variability when stimulation falls below some optimal level (see, example,
Berlyne 1960, Ch. 8; Zuckerman 1994). Further, the rate of arousal potential that is
optimal varies—within certain boundaries—from individual to individual, partly due
to their respective socialization history or cultural peculiarities (Revelle and Loftus
1990). Hence, individuals show differences in the intensity and quality of their var-
iation-seeking. Some agents are relatively more interested in, and disposed toward,
the occurrence of change, novelty, and the unexpected (Maddi 1961a). Furthermore,
within certain boundaries, continuous exposure to a complex environment shifts the
arousal function toward a need for greater complexity (Mayes 1991).
Overall, an organism’s activation level is determined by stimulation—including
novelty—stemming from exteroceptive, interoceptive, and cerebral sources
3 This is similar to arguments derived from Wundt’s Law (Wundt 1894), which states that the perceived
magnitude and quality of a stimulus is judged relative to the prevailing adaptation level of an agent.
4 Within boundaries, novelty responses habituate across successive presentations of novel items (Ranganath
and Rainer 2003). As stimuli become more predictable, the magnitude of novelty response wanes. However,
high arousal triggered by stimuli associated with unpleasant experiences are highly resistant to habituation.
5 There are also other determinants of affective states. Some levels of activation well above normal can
be accompanied by positive affect, as in the case of sexual activity (see, example, Fiske and Maddi 1961).
Moreover, slight and transitory jumps in arousal are often pleasurable as a consequence of the drop in
arousal that quickly terminates them (Berlyne 1960, p. 199). In contrast, a sustained increase in arousal is
experienced as unpleasant.
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(see Fiske and Maddi 1961). At the same time, agents are disposed to maintain their
normal level of activation (or arousal potential). 6 Hence, on the one hand, organisms
seek to experience variation in order to sustain a normal level of activation. This
endeavor provides the motivational underpinnings of explorative behavior: in case of
a lack of novelty, the activation level is exceptionally low and the agent is motivated
to alleviate this situation (see Berlyne 1960, 163ff; Maddi 1961a; Revelle and Loftus
1990).7 The extent of deviation of a stimulus from previously experienced stimuli can
be considered the novelty of a stimulus that determines its arousal potential and thus
its suitability to meet an agent’s want to experience variation.
On the other hand, when stimuli are very intense and activation is consequently
high, exceeding the preferred level, discomfort, distress, or pain is experienced.
A too high level of activation is unpleasant and associated with such affective states as
inability to concentrate, anxiety, or rapid heart beat (Fiske and Maddi 1961; Kaufman
1999). The agent is motivated to avoid such a situation.
When agents are confronted with a high amount of novel stimuli, there are certain
kinds of novelty, such as innovations in consumption goods, that can be avoided by
ignoring them—although it may not be easy to so, for example, ignore a fashion in
one’s peer group. However, many novelty-driven dynamics eventually generated by
competition cannot be avoided: new technologies at the workplace, change of the place
of residence due to restructuring firms, new modes of employment, changing social
institutions and welfare systems, a faster pace of introduction of new products and
processes in a globalized economy, etc.
This section’s thoughts lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Human agents react positively toward a certain amount of novel men-
tal experience. On the other hand, when novel stimuli exceed this amount, these are
associated with negative affect, avoidance behavior is triggered, and well-being is
impaired. Therefore, the human want for novelty has limits imposed on it by psycho-
physiological factors.
3 The second ambiguity: fluid versus strained life states
The human brain is prepared by natural evolution to respond to certain emotionally
competent stimuli and learns many more of such stimuli during its lifetime. It is the
ultimate goal of these responses to place the organism in circumstances conducive to
survival and well-being (Damasio 2003, p. 53). Moreover, organisms strive to achieve
a better than neutral life state, i.e., they try to enhance their well-being. This is the
aim of the ensemble of the body’s homeostatic regulations and the body-sensing brain
regions, i.e., neural patterns that portray responses to emotionally relevant events,
that continuously map an organism’s body state (Damasio 1996, 2003, pp. 35, 65).
Human agents are motivated to create the most beneficial situation for their own self-
preservation and efficient functioning of their body. Joyous states of the body indicate
6 Activities or responses that change the level of stimulation toward normal stimulation exhibit reinforcing
value (see Leuba 1955).
7 Humans’ need for a certain amount of novelty manifests, for example, in innovations on the demand side.
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optimal psycho-physiological coordination and smooth running of the operations of
life (Damasio 2003, p. 137; Panksepp 2003a).
A crucial determinant of the quality of an emotional state is whether the life gover-
nance processes are either strained or fluid (Damasio 2003, 131f). Fluid life states are
naturally preferred; strained life states are naturally avoided. Bechara et al. (2000) have
found structures in ventromedial prefrontal cortex that provide the substrate for learn-
ing an association between classes of complex situation and the type of bioregulatory
state including emotional state that is usually associated with that class of situation
in past individual experience. The somatic state indicates the goodness or badness of
a certain situation. Memory of the felt situation promotes the avoidance of situations
associated with negative feelings and the seeking of situations that may cause positive
feelings (Damasio 2003, p. 178; Panksepp 2003b). Emotions and feelings guide a
deliberate endeavor of self-preservation.
Moreover, while experiencing an emotional event, the orbitofrontal cortex of the
brain, which monitors and controls emotional responses, informs the organism of the
consequences (pleasant/unpleasant) of an agent’s actions (see, example, Rule et al.
2002). This region is also important for remembering the affective quality of prior
emotional experiences. Living organisms are designed with an ability to react emo-
tionally to different objects, states, and events followed by a variation of pleasure or
pain and a pattern of feeling in higher brain regions (Damasio 2003, p. 11). Every
content of conscious states needs to be grounded on the regulatory and emotional
states of the whole organism (see Thompson and Varela 2001).
The importance of affect for human behavior becomes obvious in the case of people
who suffered from a damage to regions of the frontal lobe that normally engage emo-
tions in relation to complex situations and events. They become unable to, for example,
observe social conventions and unable to decide advantageously on matters pertaining
to their own lives (see Bechara et al. 2000). Emotions and feelings play an important
role in impaired decision making. What is more, the capacity to experience affect
informs humans about what is good, bad, and neutral in their environments.
A particular type of an agent’s affective experience that can happen in many dif-
ferent kinds of activity and that is characterized by feelings of fusion with an ongoing
activity, effortlessness, focused concentration, order, and fluidity has been termed ‘flow
experience’ in psychology. ‘Flow’, as an observable regularity in human behavior, has
become a technical term in the field of intrinsic motivation. It is one means that helps
organisms to identify situations that increase subjective well-being. Moreover, it is a
well-established physiological fact that there are organism states in which the regu-
lation of life processes becomes efficient, optimal, free-flowing, and easy (Damasio
2003, p. 131).
The underlying ‘flow concept’ has been articulated by Csikszentmihalyi (1990,
1993). Flow is obtained when the contents of consciousness are in harmony with each
other and with the goals that define an agent’s self. Activities connected to this kind
of experience are motivated foremost by sheer enjoyment of the activity itself rather
than its results or external rewards. The term ‘flow’ denotes a process in which an
agent feels in control of his actions, in which action follows upon action according
to an internal logic with nearly no conscious intervention, and in which there is little
distinction between stimulus and response. The tasks undertaken have clear goals and
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provide immediate feedback. Flow experiences produce intense feelings of enjoyment
and creativity. 8 Moreover, flow experiences manifest in subjective conditions humans
call pleasure, happiness, satisfaction, or enjoyment (Csikszentmihalyi 1992, p. 24).
Hence, one goal of the self is to keep on experiencing flow. In addition, as a central
aspect of flow, personal skills and cognitive resources are experienced as according
well with the given challenges.
There are two conditions beyond flow, both representing a state of imbalance
between challenge and skill—boredom and anxiety. First, in the case of boredom,
people have to increase the complexity of the activity by developing new capabilities
and taking on new challenges. There is then a positive attraction of problem solving and
mild frustration (Berlyne 1960, p. 214; Munsinger and Kessen 1966). Second, when
the environment typically presents challenges significantly greater than an agent’s
skills and cognitive resources as well as his capability to adapt these, then life takes
on a predominantly strained quality and capacities are overstressed.
Moreover, due to an overly challenging environment, experienced uncertainty
spreads beyond a limited stimulus field and triggers negative affect (see Mitchell
1992).9 In this context, uncertainty is experienced when challenges such as new social
encounters or problem presentations are largely unrelated to previous social interaction
or problems, unpredictable by known rules, or unstructured and foreign. Consequently,
the effects of an agent’s acts—representing his skills—upon others or those problems
remain uncertain. People then tend to strive for stability, predictability, security, and
certainty, i.e., they try to rematch skills and challenges.10 Continued uncertainty leads
to chronic excitement or tension that is almost always affectively evaluated in a neg-
ative way. The dislike of excessive uncertainty seems to be a universal human trait
(Scitovsky 1981; see also Commons 1921).
Modern societies are characterized by challenges resulting from human interven-
tions in the conditions of socio-economic life and nature. Giddens (1994, Ch. 6) terms
these challenges ‘manufactured risks’. Furthermore, he says that the quality of life
essentially consists of an agent’s capacity to respond to the challenge of manufactured
risk. Therefore, as Csikszentmihalyi (1990, 208ff) argues, happiness is not the prod-
uct of passive enjoyment but of the capacity to transform challenges into an orderly
sequence of actions, in which the challenges encountered accord with the ability to
respond to them (see also Peterson 1999).
As has been shown, the universal precondition for flow is a balance between the
challenges perceived in a given situation and the skills and cognitive resources an agent
brings to it (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, p. 30). Various possibilities for action that fulfill
this correspondence can produce a flow experience. Moreover, actors can be thought
of as seeking to bring into balance their perceived skills and cognitive resources on
the one hand, and the responsibilities and challenges confronting them on the other.
Therefore, affective well-being is indirectly influenced by the amount of (cognitive)
resources and skills that people have at their disposal to achieve their goals and meet
8 Many new ideas, artifacts, or technologies have been discovered in activities that had no practical goal
but were intrinsically motivated by flow experiences.
9 In addition, uncertainty is increasing as an inevitable concomitant of novelty.
10 Kagan (1972) has maintained that there is a basic human motive to resolve uncertainty.
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their challenges. This amount potentially increases the probability of flow experiences
that are associated with positive affect (see, example, Emmons 1986). Environments in
which this is beyond an agent’s capabilities will be affectively evaluated in a negative
way (see also Morris 1999).
White (1959) argued that an individual’s set of skills (or, in his terms, competences)
represents an independent motivational system. According to his conceptualization,
competence is motivated by ‘effectance’, i.e., the feeling of pleasure and satisfaction
experienced when an agent understands a phenomenon or achieves a result (see also
Kaufman 1998). Aspects of a task encountered influence feelings of effectance and
affective evaluation inasmuch as the stimulus needs to be challenging but not exces-
sively so that it cannot be mastered (see also Ursin and Eriksen 2004). Several inquiries
have shown that there is a close interrelationship between positive affect and problem
solving (see, example, Cicchetti and Pogge-Hesse 1981). In their neuropsychological
account, Ashby et al. (1999), for example, assume that creative problem solving and
coping skills are improved by and can trigger an increase in dopamine release in the
anterior cingulate that is associated with positive affect and that positively influences
cognitive flexibility, working memory, and facilitates executive attention.
The argument leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 If an agent’s skills and cognitive resources are experienced as accord-
ing well with the challenges posed by an environment, his life state may be fluid.
However, situations in which skills and cognitive resources are insufficient to cope
with challenges are affectively evaluated in a negative way and result in strained life
states. In that case, human well-being is impaired.
4 Some implications for economic theory and policy making
Given that Hypotheses 1 and 2 hold, this section offers some thoughts in regard to
the potential implications of the human psycho-physiological dispositions mentioned
above for development of economic theory and policy making related to competitive
environments.
Economic research focuses almost exclusively on the questions of how to pro-
mote competition and elicit innovations. Societal progress emanating from innovative
activities gave rise to the hypothesis that the greater the pace of innovativeness in an
economic system, the more per capita real income and overall well-being is gener-
ated in the long run (see Witt 1996). However, the potential limits of competition,
for example, when taking into account human well-being, have not been the subject
matter of economics.11 A frequent implicit assumption in the policy making debate is
that innovativeness—i.e., the introduction of novelty to the economic system—is by
and large beneficial and should therefore be fostered politically (Witt 2003a). But, as
shown in this paper, a faster pace of innovation is not sufficient to guarantee increas-
ing well-being. A high competition-driven pace of innovative economic activities may
imply welfare losses for many members of society.
11 Rare examples are Commons (1934) and Schumpeter (1934).
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Ng (2003) claimed that welfare economics is incomplete in its depth of analysis
as it stops at the level of preference and does not include an analysis of well-being,
which is, in his words, the ultimate level. Striving for well-being or happiness, Ng
argues, manifests itself in the excess of positive affective feelings over negative affec-
tive feelings. Moreover, a measure of affective experience may be a relevant criterion
for evaluating economic outcomes (see, for a similar point, Kahneman et al. 1997).
Therefore, deeper insights into the psychology, physiology, and neurobiology of
emotion and feelings may be helpful for the formulation of principles and policies
capable of reducing distress and increasing human well-being. The fact that affective
experiencing is so important in guiding cognitive and social decision-making calls for
a revision of behavioral models relying on rationality as the major source of human
actions (see also Layard 2006).
For example, evidence from psychology supports the idea that acting in flow and
creating harmony between goals and desires, sensations and experiences, challenges
and skills improves subjective well-being (see Csikszentmihalyi 1993, Ch. 7; Damasio
2003, p. 131). According to Csikszentmihalyi (1990, p. 34), flow experience is impor-
tant to understand the strivings of the self and the quality of individual well-being.
Flow, he argues, is a sense that humans have developed in order to identify patterns of
behavior that are worth pursuing and increasing individual well-being.12
On the other hand, an agent’s inability to cope with a challenging environment
causes confusion, frustration, and negative affect. If skills and cognitive resources do
not correspond to challenges, agents tend to be worried and anxious. In the case of
diverging skills and challenges, economic dynamics that induce too many challenges
within a certain period of time may be welfare-reducing (see Hypothesis 2).13 Beyond
a certain degree of challenge-introducing competition, there is a tradeoff between
the ferocity of the competitive environment and the conditions under which human
well-being is effectively fostered.
Evolution—including economic evolution—fundamentally depends upon varia-
tion. It is a two-step process: it consists of (a) the generation of new variants; and (b) the
replacement of older by newer variants (see Endler and McLellan 1988). This compet-
itive process requires variation and simultaneously acts to reduce variation, a fact that
makes necessary processes that continuously produce new variation (Price 1995).14
Human variety-introducing creativity is the fundamental driving force behind eco-
nomic evolution (see Metcalfe 2002). The continuous generation of variety is the
crucial characteristic of cultural evolution in regard to its great pace of change. Inno-
vative responses, for example, problem solving or the active search for different models
of business, are based on the motivation and capability to be creative. However, as is
12 Flow can happen in nearly any kind of activity, at any time, provided that the agent’s skills match the
opportunities for action in the environment.
13 According to Mokyr (2002, p. 232), technical progress is almost never Pareto-superior: in the presence
of vintage-specific skills or unmalleable assets there are members in society who fail to cope with new
challenges.
14 Competition can be defined as any mutual influence as a result of which one form of behavior is spread-
ing more successfully than another one when they are present in the same environment, and as a result
displaces the second form (Jongeling 1996). Increasing intensity of competition should result in a decrease
in different forms of behavior. Thus, it seems reasonable to relate competition inversely to diversity.
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indicated by the findings presented in this paper, some competitive environments are
more conducive to an expression of human creativity than others. The reasons are to be
found in the psychological and physiological aspects of human nature.15 For example,
positive affect fosters creativity and problem solving. Thus, environments that induce
positive affect can be assumed to be conducive to human cognitive performances.
Moreover, an organism’s activation or arousal level, which depends inter alia on
novelty and challenges induced by a competitive environment, is an important deter-
minant of effectiveness of (creative) performance (Hebb 1955; Fiske and Maddi 1961;
Field et al. 1985; Kaufman 1999). Again, the function relating the two variables is
typically considered to be an inverted U: at low levels of activation, an agent may be
inattentive and easily distracted, devoting little energy to problem solving. At some-
what higher levels, the organism is alert and attentive, thereby mobilizing his resources
to cope effectively with the situation (see also Kahneman 1973; Revelle and Loftus
1990).
However, still higher levels of activation associated with excessive tension and
strong emotional states such as anxiety appear, causing behavior to be less effective.16
An intermediate level of activation associated with positive affect allows for effective
(creative) performance, whereas extreme regions of high and low activation impair
this performance. A great amount of research has shown that positive affect improves
creative problem solving, facilitates recall of neutral and positive material, fosters cog-
nitive elaboration, and systematically changes strategies used in decision-making (see,
for references, Ashby et al. 1999; Friedman and Förster 2005). An agent’s behavior
seeks to modify its activation level toward the optimal zone for the task at hand and
his well-being. The achievement of specific goals and the solving of problems aid in
maintaining normal activation level.
If an agent experiences moderate degrees of novelty and unexpectedness, for exam-
ple, during education or socialization, unexpectedness and novelty would have been
of such magnitude as to arouse positive affect and would have been associated with the
latter. An individual will then perform in a manner likely to produce novel events him-
self or will seek out situations linked to unexpected occurrences (see Maddi 1961b).
These factors also contribute to an agent’s creative performance.
Moreover, all evolving systems exhibit some source of resistance to change (see,
example, Mayr 1991, 160f), for too much receptivity to change will result in chaos.
However, a cohesive force that limits the amount and rate of change always has to be
a compromise between excessive conservatism and excessive malleability. Metcalfe
(2001) argued that evolutionary systems are always characterized by a considerable
degree of inertia and that quasi-stable relations are a prerequisite of creative change.
Consequently, he argues, novelty is crucial but so is stability; not everything can be
permanently questioned and challenged at the same time. Change is premised on
15 There is yet another finding important in this context: cooperative strategies in normal individuals lead
to the activation of regions involved in the release of dopamine and in pleasure behavior, thus rewarding
and reinforcing cooperation (Rilling et al. 2002). This inclination toward cooperation contradicts economic
systems that are based solely on competition.
16 Kaufman (1999) has argued that excessive emotional arousal also contributes to bounded rationality in
human behavior. Moreover, the optimal level of arousal seems to be lower the more complex the task at
hand.
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continuity. Only in the confidence to take many things for granted humans find the
scope for creative activity. Competition ‘red in tooth and claw’ may well destroy the
longer term ability to maintain innovative progress (see Metcalfe 2003). This paper
provides an explanation of why a certain amount of continuity is important given
humans’ cognitive dispositions.
On the one hand, a certain degree of competition promotes the efficient utilization
of resources and the introduction of innovations. On the other hand, it may—in its
excessive forms—finally reduce the generation of variety within a system and thus
its adaptability, without necessarily returning to conditions in which positive affect is
re-established and again promoting the introduction of novelty. A competitive environ-
ment that is too severe may finally inhibit innovation. Thus, competition may affect the
source of variety in behavior on which it depends. A similar position is taken by Com-
mons (1934, 763ff): he argues that competition promotes economic efficiency up to a
certain point. However, when the competitive environment demands too much from
the human agent over-extending his capability to cope, then competition may result in
affective disturbances, such as, in his words, maladaptive and anti-social behaviors,
essentially compromising economic performance (see also Kaufman 1998). Discuss-
ing public policy measures, Layard (2006) suggested the introduction of a corrective
income tax in order to ‘short circuit the rat race’ of working people and increase overall
well-being. In his view, competitive economic systems where everyone else appears as
a threat are not fostering subjective well-being, even if they generate massive outputs.
An important goal of social institutions is the regulation of life in a particular
competitive environment that exerts a certain influence on human well-being. Hence,
economic policy makers may scrutinize whether there should be institutional con-
straints on innovativeness or whether an institutional setting should determine the
pace of economic development and competition. Moreover, if other means, which are
alternative to competition-driven change, are more conducive to meet the ends humans
pursue in certain spheres, then competition may be judged, not as good or bad, but as
inefficient (for a similar argument see Commons 1934; Brozen 1952). These would
be new challenges for institutional economics.
The Schumpeterian entrepreneurs play an important role in the introduction of nov-
elty to the economy (Schumpeter 1934). These agents carry out major innovations and
thus promote waves of economic development and growth. Thereby, on the one hand,
they contribute to the overall amount of novelty and change experienced by the actors
in an economic system and present new challenges to them—a phenomenon addressed
as a process of ‘creative destruction’. On the other hand, the first entrepreneurs must
be able to enjoy a temporary monopoly that enables them to earn ‘promoter’s profits’.
Innovators become a ‘social model of behavior’ (Bandura 1986, Ch. 2) that is copied
by other agents and induce a ‘swarm-like’ appearance of entrepreneurs that marks
the beginning of the life cycle of a new industry (Witt and Cordes 2007). Extremely
competitive environments and a corresponding low rate of entrepreneurial success
may impair this dynamic that is based on processes of social-cognitive learning from
positive role models.
In his later work, Schumpeter (1942) no longer believed in the path-breaking role
of entrepreneurs. Instead, he directed his interest to the large, modern trust and its
bureaucratic teams of trained specialists that carry out innovations as routine work.
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However, Schumpeter still focused on the effects of high degrees of competition result-
ing from this kind of innovation regime: according to him, an important implication of
the trust’s incessant, competition-driven innovativeness was that these would finally
embrace monopolistic practices as a necessary concomitant (Ch. 8). Game-theoretic
models of Schumpeterian ‘innovation races’ show the effects of this kind of furious
competition on market structure (e.g., Reinganum 1985).
Although individuals exhibit differences in their variation-seeking behavior and
their handling of challenges—due to socialization effects, learning, natural disposi-
tion, or the resources and skills that they have at their disposal—they all face an
upper boundary of habituation to, and positive evaluation of, novelty and of their
capability to cope effectively with a challenging environment without experiencing
strained life states. Novel stimuli, for example, elicit amplified affective experiences
that are highly resistant to habituation (Kahneman and Miller 1986; Ranganath and
Rainer 2003). Therefore, within limits, the inverted U-shaped relationship between the
degree of novelty and an individual agent’s well-being mentioned in Section 2 can—in
the course of habituation—be shifted toward higher amounts of novel stimuli.
However, as a consequence of these individual differences and the ambiguous
effects of novelty and challenges discussed earlier in this paper, there are competitive,
stimuli providing environments where, for example, agents who appreciate a higher
amount of novelty benefit, while other agents, who have a lower upper boundary of
adaptation to novelty, suffer from decreases in their well-being, when faced with the
same level of stimulation. It is not easy for a policy maker to balance this two-sided-
ness of competition and individual experiences. There may be areas in a society, for
example, science, where a higher level of competition may be stimulating, while the
same level of competition may inhibit activities and well-being in other occupational
fields. As a consequence, policy making has to take into account different domains
of life. It should tailor social institutions to the regulation of life, in particular areas
of activity and competitive environments as well as to the agents involved, especially
in regard to their educational background. In any case, sooner or later, a threshold
beyond which negative affective experiences prevail is reached in all these realms, by
all the individuals. Moreover, experiences regarding changes in fundamental aspects
of life, such as the family, the social milieu, or the basis of livelihood are probably
affectively evaluated in very similar ways across individuals.
The societal acceptance of novelty could be increased by offering temporary spe-
cial protection or assistance to agents who have invested in certain ‘vintages’ of skills,
capital, or occupations, for example, by delaying the introduction of novelty. In these
cases, some time would be given to them enabling an adaptation to changing cir-
cumstances, keeping challenges and personal resources in line with each other, and
relieving uncertainty, thereby potentially avoiding strained life states of those affected.
In addition, the willingness to invest in assets subject to vintage effects may increase
due to such a protection. The aggregated welfare effects of these kinds of political
intervention may overcompensate losses accruing from a postponed novelty-induced
structural change of the economy.
Other potential political implications result from a consideration of the long term
effects of novelty: while, in the short run, people may (affectively) suffer from a high
amount of novelty introduced to them, its longer term consequences may be positive.
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Technological innovations, for example, often impair the position of some members
of society but may ultimately lead to an improvement of overall living conditions.
Hence, what shows up in this context are externalities of novelty that may even affect
different generations of actors. Policy makers may think about ways to alleviate these
external effects by devising means that balance the differential repercussions of nov-
elty, such as, for example, intergenerational funds.17 This potentially positive long
term effect of novelty is lost if the competition-driven introduction of novelty non-
transiently exceeds the individuals’ want for a certain amount of novel stimuli and
thus permanently impairs social well-being.
Possibly, there is also a connection between the acceptance of policy reforms and
the overall amount of novelty and challenges brought to the agents: if policy makers
provide a kind of basic security, i.e., if they keep away novelty and uncertainty from the
agents in some domains of life, this may ease the introduction of novel elements to the
economy in other areas. Moreover, if people receive some basic social security, such
as health care, a certain degree of protection against dismissal, unemployment insur-
ance, or a guaranteed pension scheme, a society may be more receptive to change and
reform in general. The acceptance of political measurements and institutional change
in a society can then be raised when accompanied by the explicit retention of some
aspects of life, thereby channeling and restricting the amount of novelty and challenges
introduced to the agents. This would be an unorthodox justification for state activity
in these realms based on insights into cognitive and affective aspects of human agents
that are rarely accounted for by economists.
In the context of this paper’s argument, a central problem for any policy maker is
the specification of the threshold beyond which novelty and challenges introduced by
a competitive environment are evaluated negatively by an agent. There are objective
measures detecting positive and negative affect in subjects depending on their environ-
ment; the human brain constructs a running affective commentary that permanently
evaluates experiences.18 Therefore, Kahneman (1999) has argued, an assessment of a
person’s objective happiness over a period of time is possible by recording the quality
of experience at each point, i.e., by measuring the relative frequencies and durations
of positive and negative affect (see also Panksepp 2003b).
Thus, real-time measures of present experience can be obtained and aggregated to
yield a measure of objective well-being (see also Ito and Cacioppo 1999). Questions
about well-being and general happiness may be answered on a scientific, objective,
naturalistic, and reproducible basis. A combination of methods will be necessary to
characterize the objective well-being of individuals and groups. This will ultimately
enable a bottom-up approach to the analysis of well-being and the aggregating of
differences in individual experiences (Ng 1997; Kahneman 1999). More general hap-
piness questions could be answered by sampling domains of life and assessing their
17 This argument is similar to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion prominent in welfare economics: an economic
situation is superior to another when the welfare gains of potential winners exceed the welfare losses of
potential losers such that the latter could be potentially compensated by the winners (Hicks 1939; Kaldor
1939).
18 Methods from psychophysiology, psychoendocrinology, behavioral analysis, and brain biochemistry




status with respect to well-being. In principle, it should be possible to examine the
affective experiences of representative individuals in a society and to draw conclusions
even for an aggregated approach to policy making.
In addition, social indicators and subjective well-being measures are important to
evaluate a society and add substantially to economic indicators that are usually pre-
ferred by policy makers (see Diener and Eunkook 1997). An examination of correla-
tions of certain predictor variables with subjective well-being measures could include
variables such as precarious employment, change of the place of residence or the
social milieu, necessary adaptations to new equipment at the workplace, amount of
new problems arising at the workplace within a certain time span, or other measures
of change and novelty in an individual’s environment. It may then be possible to deter-
mine the threshold beyond which most agents start to evaluate their environment as
strained and in an affectively negative way. By this means, information can be offered
to the agents concerning the impact of the state of the economy and the institutional
conditions on subjective well-being. The individuals can then take into account these
information and introduce them to the political process.
Frey and Stutzer (2002, p. 15) have shown that political decentralization and the
possibility of political participation affect subjective well-being in a positive way. This
may be due to an increased range of an agent’s perceived possibilities to cope directly
with the challenges posed by the environment, a feeling of control, and extended self-
determination (see Hypothesis 2). The approach brought forward in this paper may
thus provide some of the cognitive underpinnings of such an effect.
Potentially, there are two levels at which policy makers could intervene: first, within
certain boundaries, individuals can adapt to increasing novelty by shifting their arousal
function toward a need for a greater amount of novel stimuli. Socialization processes
and an educational system that take advantage of this human capability would prepare
agents to cope with a rapidly changing environment and would foster a culture of
innovativeness. Second, which is a more ambitious challenge for policy making, an
institutional set up could be necessary that prevents too much change in the agents’
environments and too many challenges posed to them. Policy measures may comprise,
for example, regulations on too excessive forms of precarious employment or even on
innovativeness as such.
To conclude, there are two major possible consequences of an excessive degree of
competition: (a) the agent’s creative potential may be inhibited and thus the crucial
source of variety in an economic system as well as his overall economic performance;
or (b) people may feel unpleasant, given their competitive environment, and thus an
important political goal—the enhancement of welfare—would be missed. A too great
pace of innovativeness may, while increasing per capita real income, impair the well-
being of economic agents.
The following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 3 Given the insights of Hypotheses 1 and 2, an excessive amount of nov-
elty and a too challenging environment impair human performance and well-being.
What is more, given the fact that competition introduces novelty and new challenges to
an economic system, there should be limits to competition-driven economic dynamics
that are to be found within human beings.
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5 Conclusions
Potential conflicts between the evolved cognitive endowments of humans on the one
hand, and the dynamics of economic development on the other, have not been the
subject matter of profound inquiry in economics. This paper has shown that evidence
from various disciplines indicates that there are indeed limits to economic dynamics
that are to be found in the cognitive setup of human agents.19
First, the human want for novelty, while it is certainly susceptible to cultural condi-
tioning, has limits imposed on it by psycho-physiological factors. Too much novelty is
associated with negative affect. Second, competitive environments that over-exert an
agent’s skills and (cognitive) resources result in strained life states that impair individ-
ual well-being and (creative) performance. Consequently, a competitive environment
introducing novelty and challenges to the agents that is too severe may decrease
human well-being. Some implications for economic theory and policy making have
been shown.
Human consciousness still reflects the evolutionary continuities that can be found
in the organic emergence of the human brain and that still impose constraints on
economic behavior and development, in the sense that what is optimal, desirable, or
appropriate in the world of pure economic theory may not be compatible with the
peculiarities of real world human beings.
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